

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2728

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 301

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SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 22, 1975

(SALT TWO - 741)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 22, 1975, INCLUDING
LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE XIII.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 22, 1975

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS JGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE USSAR AND THE U.S. AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IS THE
UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT OF
NOVEMBER 24 AND IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END
OF 1985 WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL
SECURITY.

THIS AGREED PRINCIPLE IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR
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THE EFFORTS OF THE SIDES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS,

FOR THERE CAN BE NO OTHER BASIS FOR ACHIEVING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN THIS FIELD WHICH IS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH ENSURING THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL, AND EVEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK OF FULLY AND CONSISTENTLY EMBODYING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, THE SOVIET SIDE DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS ONCE AGAIN THE ISSUE OF U.S. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH, DUE TO THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT, ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS THE ISSUE OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THESE ARE MAJOR ISSUES.

I

BEGINNING IN 1969 AND UP TO THE PRESENT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN INVARIABLY EMPHASIZING THAT IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALL THOSE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

SUCH AN APPROACH, BEING BASED ON AN OBJECTIVE AND UNBIASED ANALYSIS OF ALL RELEVANT FACTORS, IS NATURAL AND DEEPLY LOGICAL.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS CITED CONCRETE SUBSTANTIATED DATA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THEIR IMPACT UPON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, HAS RECOGNIZED THAT THESE SYSTEMS CAN BE VIEWED AS HAVING AN INFLUENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC EQUATION."

THERE IS NOTHING TO SHOW THAT THE ROLE OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS HAS CHANGED IN ANY WAY IN TERMS OF THE NATURE OF THEIR EFFECT UPON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

INDEED, WE TALK OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH, DUE TO THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT, ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, WE HAVE IN MIND
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THE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPONENT OF ONE OF THE SIDE'S ARSENAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS POTENTIAL IS ALSO WELL KNOWN--IT IS MANY HUNDREDS OF DELIVERY VEHICLES CAPABLE OF CARRYING THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES DEPLOYED AT U.S. BASES IN EUROPE AND IN OTHER AREAS NEAR THE BORDERS OF THE USSR; CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT. THE ROLE OF FORWARD BASES FOR U.S. SUBMARINES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD

STATES IS ALSO KNOWN; THIS HAS BEEN REFERRED TO MORE THAN ONCE.

THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE THAT THIS DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS ALREADY NOTED HERE, THE QUESTION OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AROSE AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, AND SINCE THEN THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY ADVOCATING THAT THIS PROBLEM BE SOLVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING WORKED OUT.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT UNDER A REALISTIC AND OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CANNOT BE BYPASSED.

A BUILDUP OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BY ONE OF THE SIDES WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED, AND COULD NOT BE JUDGED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES. SUCH A BUILDUP WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT UPON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND COULD LEAD TO REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WOULD BE SERVED BY REDUCING SUCH SYSTEMS, AND THIS, BEING FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING MUTUAL TRUST AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE FOR SECURING MILITARY DETENTE.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 301

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II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST MEETINGS OF THE DELEGATIONS AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS THE ATTENTION OF BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS OF THE SIDES. NATURALLY, APPROPRIATE ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO THIS ISSUE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS, BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS THOROUGHLY ANALYZED THIS QUESTION, CONSIDERING ITS GREAT GENERAL AND SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. SIDE HAS MADE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TOWARD ITS POSITIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ENHANCING THE SECRET

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EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF A BROAD UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN SETTING FORTH U.S. PROPOSALS ON A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, ON APRIL 20, 1970 THE U.S. DELEGATION STATED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT "WOULD BE BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY." PROPOSALS CONCERNING NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING WORKED OUT FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE MADE BY THE U.S. SIDE LATER AS WELL, IN PARTICULAR, AT THE MEETING OF MAY 15, 1973.

CONTINUATION OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL, SHOWS A CERTAIN DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF PRECLUDING POSSIBILITIES OF CIRCUMVENTING OR WEAKENING, THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER, THE LIMITATIONS WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

III

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS THE SIDES HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD STATES. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED DURING CONCLUSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS WELL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET SIDE MADE A PERTINENT STATEMENT REFLECTING ITS APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE TO THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985 ALSO CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, BEARING IN MIND THAT PROGRAMS OF BUILDING UP OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THIRD STATES ARE NOT STANDING STILL.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EXISTANCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES HAS AN IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF THE SIDES, AND IN THE LONG TERM SUCH IMPACT MAY INCREASE. THE U.S. SIDE HAS RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FACTOR.

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CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO FIND, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN EMPHASIZED HERE THAT WE ARE NOT SPEAKING OF SOME SORT OF MEASURES AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THIRD STATES. WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A FACTOR WHICH PERCEPTIBLY AFFECTS THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN THE SIDES.

IV

MR. AMBASSADOR,

SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF FURTHER LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS AND CONSEQUENTLY OF PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THESE LIMITATIONS REQUIRES, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT THE SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS NOT TO ENGAGE IN ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING IT PROVISIONS THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD, SUCH OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING THE NEW AGREEMENT AND OF REACHING THE COMMON GOAL OF REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE SOVIET

GOVERNMENT TO TABLE A NEW PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, READING AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN BRACKETS NEW SOVIET DRAFT OF ARTICLE XIII, ATTACHED HERETO, AS READ AND HANDED OVER END BRACKETS.

IN TABLING THIS NEW PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT, THE SOVIET SIDE IS GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR QUESTIONS WHICH, WE ARE CONVINCED, ARE OF SERIOUS PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE USSR IS IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND ENSUES FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES.

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ASSUMPTION OF CORRESPONDING MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW WORDING OF ARTICLE XIII WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND WOULD INCREASE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT DOCUMENT.

V

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH HERE, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY ITS AUTHORITIES TO REAFFIRM THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES AN IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE TO THE ISSUES OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF FORWARD BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

TABLED BY SOVIET SIDE
AUGUST 22, 1975

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

ARTICLE XIII

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TAKE ACTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER.

JOHNSON

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